“Figures like Musk and Zuckerberg have made it very clear that they will use all available technological resources to influence the policies of other nations,” says Zhuang Fei, content director of the Chinese media outlet Wave Media.
According to Zhuang, China, and other countries should accelerate research and initiatives on digital sovereignty and collaborate. He believes China can leverage its strengths to engage in deeper global cooperation, share experiences, and help other countries resist and combat US technological and digital dominance.
In an exclusive interview with Brasil de Fato/TVT, Zhuang explains that, unlike the US, AI development in China focuses on practical applications for daily life and industrial production. He emphasizes that the Chinese government’s management of public opinion on social media is more transparent and systematic compared to the approach adopted in the United States.
Zhuang notes that the perception of total defense of freedom of expression in the US does not align with revelations of Google’s support for Israel and various complaints of censorship by Meta, as reported by The Intercept and the Arab Center for the Advancement of Social Media, concerning pro-Palestine positions.
Contrary to Meta’s director Mark Zuckerberg’s statement in early February, when he announced changes to information verification policies, Meta’s platforms have not been censored in China. Zuckerberg’s announcement highlighted dismantling the fact-checking program and implementing a community-based rating system similar to the one used on X (formerly Twitter).
Zuckerberg stated that these changes aim to “restore freedom of expression on our platforms.” He argued that the “US has the strongest constitutional protections for free speech in the world.” He also claimed, “China has censored our apps from even operating in the country.” Zhuang Fei, who is also the chief content officer of Wave Media, clarifies that the Chinese government’s requirements for companies like Zuckerberg’s are basic, such as protecting personal data and overseeing the company’s setup process.
In 2018, a former Cambridge Analytica employee reported that the company had illegally used information from 50 million Facebook profiles to influence voters in the United States and the United Kingdom, which Zhuang Fei cites as evidence of the need for caution on the Chinese side.
Brasil de Fato/TVT: What’s your stance on what Zuckerberg said about your country?
Zhuang Fei: Zuckerberg’s recent statements are, in fact, predictable from the perspective of the Chinese authorities. Although Facebook has never officially entered the Chinese market, Zuckerberg himself is quite familiar to the Chinese public and officials.
Beginning in 2012, Zuckerberg made repeated efforts to lobby the Chinese government through various activities in China, aiming to introduce Facebook or other business ventures of his company. Between 2012 and 2016, Zuckerberg frequently appeared in Chinese media. He visited China many times, and in 2016, he even staged a jog through Beijing to express goodwill. He once stated in interviews, “I love China,” as part of his public relations efforts. At that time, many Chinese media, scholars, and officials recognized Zuckerberg’s actions as strategic, intended to facilitate Facebook’s entry into China.
However, during negotiations, he consistently refused to comply with China’s fundamental requirements for social media platforms, resulting in no substantive progress despite his public gestures. Ultimately, Facebook failed to enter the Chinese market. After 2016, Zuckerberg ceased lobbying efforts and shifted his stance, becoming openly critical of China. Statements about the lack of freedom of expression in China marked a significant departure from his earlier tone.
Zuckerberg’s recent statements align with the original assessment made by Chinese authorities. China is open to collaboration with American corporations, including tech giants like Apple and Tesla, led by CEOs such as Tim Cook and Elon Musk, as long as they operate fairly and comply with Chinese regulations. Such collaborations leverage corporate strengths while fostering the development of weaker sectors within China. However, compared to Cook and Musk, Zuckerberg is seen as less pragmatic and more focused on self-promotion, which ultimately hindered substantive negotiations. Zuckerberg’s current remarks are perceived as politically motivated, aimed at aligning with Trump-era policies to curry favor. By invoking China in his rhetoric, Zuckerberg is seen as using it as a political tool for his agenda.
Overall, Chinese officials, academics, and the public are familiar with Zuckerberg due to his high-profile presence in Chinese media from 2012 to 2016. He gave many interviews to Chinese media and did a lot of self-promotion to Chinese officials and the public. However, observing his shift in tone—from opposing Trump to supporting him—Chinese officials and the public view the decision not to engage with Zuckerberg’s company as prudent, avoiding cooperation with a CEO perceived as insincere and self-serving.
Can you elaborate on why apps like Instagram and Facebook don’t work here?
Zhuang Fei: The Chinese government has long had ideas about digital sovereignty. While many countries, including Europe and Brazil, are now discussing digital sovereignty, this concept was not well understood when the internet was beginning to develop globally in the early 21st century. At that time, some information experts within the Chinese government recognized that social media platforms were closely tied to this crucial idea of digital sovereignty. They realized that allowing a foreign social media platform, especially one from a country that might view China as a competitor, to operate freely within China’s borders could lead to actions detrimental to national interests. Even though China’s regulatory mechanisms of digital sovereignty were not yet fully developed at the time, a clear bottom line was established: any foreign platform wishing to host servers and operate social media services in China would need to do so under the supervision and guidance of the Chinese government. This became a minimum requirement.
During negotiations with China, Facebook and Google claimed to be entirely neutral and fair. However, the internal conflicts between Trump and the Democratic Party in 2020 exposed many behind-the-scenes issues, such as Google’s deep cooperation with the FBI and the US government. In hindsight, the Chinese government’s caution was entirely justified. As I mentioned earlier, if a company agrees to some basic requirements set by the Chinese government, cooperation is welcome. For example, Apple accepted these conditions by agreeing to store Chinese user data within China through the iCloud Guizhou project. Apple localized its servers in Guizhou to store data for Chinese users, which was considered a reasonable request. Similarly, TikTok in the US agreed to store American user data in Texas.
In contrast, the US attitude toward Facebook and Google’s operations in China has been inconsistent. When these companies were dominant, the US emphasized that their platforms should be unrestricted and universally accessible. However, as Chinese platforms like TikTok have risen, the narrative has shifted, with the US citing national security concerns and so on. This shift explains why Facebook and Instagram are not operational in China. Whether due to pressure from the US government or internal company mechanisms, these platforms either cannot or will not comply with China’s regulatory requirements.
China’s demands and regulations are seen as entirely reasonable, and some companies, like Tesla, have expressed willingness to cooperate under these conditions. Elon Musk, for example, has openly stated his readiness to work within the framework set by the Chinese government, which has also benefited Tesla’s operations in China. If a product cannot be launched in China, it is likely due to the company’s internal management issues or back-end mechanisms rather than problems on the Chinese government’s side. Ultimately, this reflects challenges within the companies themselves, and current facts support the view that this is not an issue with the Chinese government.
In his argument that there is a kind of global trend toward “censorship” of social media, Zuckerberg also spoke about Latin America, saying that “Latin American countries have secret courts that can quietly order companies to take things down.” In Brazil, many experts are now concerned that the changes represent yet another threat to institutions and democracy (by allowing even more far-right speech). Now, many people are looking at China and appreciating the importance of not relying on social media owned by a powerful minority in the United States. How important is it for China to have sovereignty over social media?
This is an issue that the Chinese government and its citizens hold in high regard. The concept of digital sovereignty is becoming increasingly significant. With Trump’s rise to power, billionaires like Elon Musk and Mark Zuckerberg have been more blatant in leveraging their influence and cloud capital to secure greater personal benefits. For example, Musk has openly used his influence on platforms like Twitter to sway political dynamics in countries such as Brazil and some European nations. Since Trump’s rise, such behavior has become even more transparent. The Chinese government recognized this problem early on and implemented preventive measures and regulations. Despite these efforts, the US continues to utilize information warfare on the internet to criticize China’s governance model and Taiwan issue and attempt to incite “color revolution” activities within China. This is a persistent area of focus for China’s authorities and cybersecurity agencies.
During the COVID-19 pandemic, for instance, China encountered what it refers to as “internet armies,” which are called 1450 in China, from the US, Europe, and other countries and regions. These entities specialize in conducting information warfare against China. Even though China’s internet infrastructure is among the most advanced globally, addressing issues like online information warfare remains a significant challenge, often leading to social conflicts or other disruptions. Therefore, the concept of digital sovereignty is critically important.
If certain social media platforms or AI-related technologies that manage vast amounts of data were to operate entirely without governmental oversight or regulation, the potential harm could be enormous. Ten years ago, platforms like Twitter could directly influence events such as the Arab Spring, which were relatively visible phenomena. However, without robust regulatory capabilities, future developments in artificial intelligence could lead to more insidious threats—problems that are hidden and difficult to detect compared to the visible challenges posed by platforms like Twitter. Consequently, the repeated emphasis on digital sovereignty today is entirely justified, not only for European nations but also for global South countries like Brazil.
As artificial intelligence advances, developed countries led by the US could exploit large AI models for opaque actions, threatening the digital sovereignty of other nations. Without adequate technological capabilities, such actions may become impossible to monitor or counter. Figures like Musk and Zuckerberg have essentially made it clear that they will use all available technological resources to influence the politics of other nations. This issue is now out in the open. Other nations, including China, must accelerate their research and initiatives in digital sovereignty while fostering international collaboration. China can leverage its strengths to engage in deeper cooperation globally, share experiences, and assist other countries in resisting and countering US technological and digital hegemony.
How do regulations on hate speech, violence, and related issues on Chinese social media work?
Unlike what many people might assume, I believe that the Chinese government’s management of public opinion on social media is more transparent and systematic compared to the approach adopted in the United States. In the US, the system outwardly claims to uphold complete freedom of speech but often lacks genuine oversight. For example, following the Gaza-Israel conflict, the Democratic Party proposed suggestions for content moderation. However, revelations from internal documents, including emails from Google, reveal that US agencies like the FBI and the White House privately coordinate with companies like Google and Facebook, guiding what should be promoted or removed. This demonstrates that the US approach is not as free as it appears; instead, it operates under a veil of free speech while engaging in behind-the-scenes negotiations. Google and Facebook present themselves as champions of free speech but, in practice, comply with directives from American government authorities.
In contrast, China applies a dual-layer system of management for internet content.
The first layer involves the Chinese government directly moderating content on platforms like Sina Weibo and other domestic social media sites by deleting posts or accounts. Agencies such as the Cyberspace Administration of China (CAC) have established a comprehensive set of regulatory frameworks addressing violent, graphic, hateful, or intentionally false content. These rules are not aimed at individual internet users but are instead directed at major tech companies like Tencent, Sina, and ByteDance. Leaders from these companies regularly attend meetings in Beijing with the CAC, where internet governance issues are openly discussed. Here, “open” refers to discussions involving representatives from all companies of key social media platforms. In these meetings, participants review issues encountered over the past month and propose improvements. While this approach might not be flawless, it is relatively transparent. In contrast, claims of unregulated free speech in the United States—championed by figures like Elon Musk—often mask a lack of oversight that leads to other forms of manipulation. The sheer complexity of the internet, with its overwhelming volume of information, makes it difficult for the average user to discern reliable content. For smaller or developing nations with limited technical and financial resources, combating the influence of powerful tech figures or corporations is particularly challenging. In such contexts, emphasizing “free speech” without moderation only amplifies the dominance of internet giants, enabling them to wield unchecked power over individuals and governments. China’s approach to regulating large tech companies is to establish clear and adaptive rules. These rules evolve but remain publicly available and transparent. Companies like Tencent and Sina are well aware of these regulations and adhere to them.
The second layer involves individual platforms developing their strategies for managing content based on the overarching rules set by the government. These strategies often vary depending on the platform’s focus. For instance, some platforms that primarily serve as entertainment hubs may enforce stricter controls on political topics to maintain their content’s alignment with their entertainment-oriented nature. Conversely, platforms like Weibo, which accommodate a broader range of topics, may adopt a more lenient approach toward political discussions, resulting in a greater presence of such content.
While specific rules and enforcement strategies may differ among platforms, all platforms operate under the guidance of the official regulatory framework. If a user’s account is suspended or their content is removed, they typically have recourse to file an appeal. If this proves ineffective, users can pursue judicial appeals through legal channels. For example, if a platform unjustly deactivates an account, the user has the right to seek reinstatement via the legal system. Cases of this nature are becoming increasingly common in China, especially when the account in question holds significant commercial or economic value. Many users have successfully restored their accounts through judicial processes. In this context, China’s approach to balancing content moderation—targeting hate speech, online harassment, or hostile foreign influence—while fostering collaboration with platforms like TikTok and Douyin demonstrates a structured yet evolving regulatory model.
Although it is not without flaws and room for improvement, this dual-layer system serves as an example of relatively effective Internet governance. Compared to the mechanisms promoted by the United States, which often emphasize a laissez-faire approach to moderation under the guise of free speech, China’s model appears more structured and pragmatic. It offers insights that could be valuable in shaping global internet governance practices.
Part of the problem with US-dominated social media is that it is being used to influence politics in countries (in Latin America) through bots and AI. China is one of the main countries pushing for rules for global governance on AI. How relevant and urgent is this debate at this time?
President Xi Jinping said that artificial intelligence should be “people-centered and for the good” a long time ago. China is very serious about the management and the global development of AI. As I said earlier, Musk and some other US tech, which I call “tech hegemony,” are very concerned about this. Musk is doing everything he can to promote Tesla’s AI; Zuckerberg has also been involved in AI for a long time; and Google’s AI is also very powerful. I think two aspects of China’s AI are worth discussing. First, China is stronger in the application of AI, which is different from the AI in the United States. Of course, in terms of the technical level of AI, the US may still lead the world. Although China is also developing rapidly, overall we may be slightly behind the United States. However, when it comes to the practicality and application of AI, we can say that China is doing more and better than the United States. Since 2013, China has successfully applied for about 38,000 patents related to AI, which is a world-leading number.
So from this point of view, I think China is more focused on how to make AI useful in real life, in ordinary industrial production, and social life, which I think is very important, because we have seen a worrying phenomenon: the United States’ AI is becoming increasingly detached from practical applications. In other words, big companies are using their AI more for finance, virtual currency, and as the censor of some social media. Of course, this is understandable, as it aligns with the companies’ pursuit of value. These abstract or intangible applications are more likely to generate immediate economic benefits, provide quicker feedback on stock prices, and create a more compelling capital story. This is largely determined by the national context of the United States and its capitalism-driven market. What’s different in China is that we’ve been guided and valued by the state, which is very focused on industry. We now have Industry 2.0 and Industry 4.0.
We’re also focused on how to apply AI in areas like smart cars, energy use, basic robot factories, robot production, and so on. What I want to emphasize is that the Chinese government’s strategy in the development of AI is more conducive to cooperation between China and the international community, especially developing countries and Global South countries. I think the misguided approach to AI in the United States is more likely to cause many people to lose their jobs. A lot of people are worried that AI will bring mass layoffs as many tasks may not need to be done by humans, which I believe will only happen when AI is detached from practical usage. However, if we fully apply the capabilities of artificial intelligence in real industry, like what China is doing now, it will not cause worrying unemployment but create more new jobs. One of the major challenges faced by many developing countries today is the lack of capital and insufficient social governance capabilities. This has resulted in the inability of many basic industries or enterprises to survive in these relatively underdeveloped countries. There are also, of course, many objective factors at play, including political instability within governments. However, the application of artificial intelligence could precisely help with some of these issues.
So I think if artificial intelligence can be fully applied in some practical ways, it can help developing countries and the Global South countries catch up with developed countries in many areas. Overall, artificial intelligence is very good and favorable for all humanity, and China is willing and able to cooperate with the Global South countries in this field.
This brings us back to President Xi Jinping’s emphasis on “a people-centered approach, intelligence for the good.” The “people-centered approach” means that the purpose of artificial intelligence is ultimately to serve people. Therefore, we are putting more emphasis on applying AI to practical scenarios in China. For example, in many parts of China, electric vehicles and smart cars are already commonplace, and even the presence of intelligent robots can now be seen in places like hotels and streets. Many foreign visitors are often surprised to discover how extensively AI has already been applied in China. Another example is China’s large-scale integration of artificial intelligence into the medical field. Today, almost all hospitals in China have adopted electronic, data-driven systems, and these facilities are updated almost every year. As a Chinese citizen, I can say from experience that it is very different to visit the same hospital this year and the next year.
These are areas prioritized by the Chinese government where AI development can bring greater improvements. In the medical field, for instance, AI can quickly diagnose minor illnesses or discomforts, allowing for swift treatment. This technology significantly reduces the burden of training new doctors, addressing the critical shortage of medical professionals due to China’s large population. Such medical applications are highly suitable for sharing with other countries in the Global South, such as Brazil, other parts of South America, and especially Africa, where scarcity of qualified doctors and medical infrastructure is common. This embodies the “people-centered approach” President Xi highlighted, and it also represents a key direction for China’s next steps in cooperation with Global South countries: finding ways to share the application of AI with more nations.
Another point worth mentioning is the Chinese government’s experience in managing artificial intelligence, which I think is also very important. Nowadays, although the technological development of the US’s artificial intelligence is very advanced, especially after Trump came to power this time, the US government’s management ability has been gradually deteriorating. We can almost conclude that, in the face of big technology companies like Musk, Zuckerberg, and Bezos, these “giants,” the government’s management ability is very limited. More simply put, it has no way to constrain or guide them. In fact, in the US today, technology giants like Musk can act without restraint, using their AI resources to develop whatever they want.
From this perspective, I think only the Chinese government has the will and the ability to effectively manage artificial intelligence. Because in the nearly 20 years of the development of the Internet, the Chinese government has had extensive experience in managing these companies and dealing with their business operations. Therefore, I believe the Chinese government can contribute in this regard to the global effort to explore how to regulate artificial intelligence in a way that best supports the development of artificial intelligence in the industry while continuously improving the relevant rules and laws. China is the first country in the world to legislate on generative AI, and I mention this example to highlight how the Chinese government has consistently supported AI development while simultaneously refining management strategies through legislation and government standards.
From my perspective, this approach is the only way to adapt to the global development of artificial intelligence in the future, because AI will certainly facilitate greater global information exchange and circulation. Therefore, as it develops, if we fail to incorporate AI into the framework of digital sovereignty, smaller countries, even some European nations, for their AI backwardness, may become vulnerable to the influence or harm of corporate or technological giants like Musk. We can already see Musk’s blatant attacks on Europe, using his digital influence and AI resources to target the UK and France with tweets that aren’t exactly misinformation but are driven by AI. Without a comprehensive set of technological and regulatory capabilities, it will be impossible to prevent or address such issues.
Therefore, I believe that these two points, one is China’s ability to apply AI in practice and the other is China’s experience in managing AI, are both forms of public service that we can offer to many other countries around the world. President Xi Jinping and the Chinese government are willing to work with more countries, especially those in the Global South, to jointly participate in the global regulation and governance of AI. From this perspective, we think China’s AI initiative is very positive. China not only has the will but also the responsibility and capability to undertake this task. Moreover, we believe that in the future, China should be able to reach ca onsensus with more countries on artificial intelligence and digital sovereignty. This, especially in the context of political instability in the United States, will be a crucial prerequisite for ensuring that more countries around the world can maintain stable development. We see this as a very promising trend.
